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Abstract—Security intrusions in large systems is a problem
due to its lack of scalability with the current IDS-based
approaches. This paper describes the RECLAMO project,
where an architecture for an Automated Intrusion Response
System (AIRS) is being proposed. This system will infer the
most appropriate response for a given attack, taking into
account the attack type, context information, and the trust and
reputation of the reporting IDSs. RECLAMO is proposing a
novel approach: diverting the attack to a specific honeynet that
has been dynamically built based on the attack information.
Among all components forming the RECLAMO’s architecture,
this paper is mainly focused on defining a trust and reputation
management model, essential to recognize if IDSs are exposing
an honest behavior in order to accept their alerts as true.
Experimental results confirm that our model helps to encourage
or discourage the launch of the automatic reaction process.
Keywords-autonomous systems; reaction networks; trust and
reputation; collaborative systems; virtualization
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet plays nowadays an important role in our daily
life, but its increasing usage has also arisen many potential
risks. To protect the availability, authenticity, confidentiality,
integrity, and reliability of the network components, many
researchers are working in the field of network security.
In this area, access control includes a variety of security
technologies, from authentication and identity management
technologies for controlling who can access the provided
services to firewall technologies for filtering traffic from/to
the organization network. In addition to firewalls, there are a
number of components that help in detecting and mitigating
remote attacks, like Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) that
are capable of monitoring security parameters in order to
detect malicious or unexpected behaviors.
IDS technologies have rapidly evolved in recent years
and now there exist very mature tools with a high extent
of reliability in the intrusion detection area. But IDSs are
mainly passive components and their effectiveness is not
enough for complex attacks; the common response of IDSs
is passive, such as the notification to other components.
As the number of security incidents increases, becoming
more sophisticated and widespread [1], there is a strong
need of automating the detection and reaction processes to
face them. Automated Intrusion Response Systems (AIRS)
provide the best possible defense, as well as shortening or
eliminating the delay before administrators come into play.
AIRSs are security technologies whose main goal is to
choose and trigger automated responses against intrusions
detected by IDSs, in order to mitigate them or reduce their
impact. Unfortunately, the state of the art in AIRSs is not
as mature as with IDSs. Reactions against intrusions are not
optimal, and IDSs have difficulty detecting intrusions in real
time and triggering automated responses.
In this context, we describe in this paper the approach
taken by the RECLAMO project (Virtual and Collaborative
Honeynets based on Trust Management and Autonomous
Systems applied to Intrusion Management), an ongoing
R&D project funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and
Innovation. This project proposes an autonomous response
system able to infer the most appropriate response for a
given intrusion, taking into account not just the intrusion,
but also other parameters related to it such as the context or
the trust and reputation of the network source.
Figure 1 depicts the main functional blocks of the
RECLAMO proposal. Some of them are briefly addressed
throughout the paper, although others, like the trust and
reputation management system, are thoroughly presented as
one of the first results in the ongoing RECLAMO project.
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Figure 1. Main functional blocks proposed in the RECLAMO project
One of the most promising approaches in the project
proposal is based on the inclusion of the so-called deception
responses; as a response to some type of intrusion, the attack
might be diverted to a specific honeynet in order to confine
and analyze it. RECLAMO addresses how to dynamically
define, generate, and deploy a honeynet built ad-hoc for the
attacker preferences. These honeynets will be implemented
on top of a network virtualization platform.
Nonetheless, the decision of building a specific honeynet
in response to a security threat is subjected to the informa-
tion gathered from the monitoring system. The generation
of bogus attack information, usually coming from malicious
IDSs with a dishonest or misbehaving attitude, can lead
the AIRS to react mistakenly. It can create and deploy
an unnecessary honeynet, misusing system resources, as a
consequence of a failed detection because of making use of
untruthful information. Hence, bogus alerts and attacks must
be discarded to avoid errors in detection processes.
As a promising solution, this paper presents the design of
a trust and reputation model, as well as giving a global vision
of the proposed autonomous response system, that assesses
the behavior of IDSs by taking all security information
(alerts and attacks) generated by them in the past.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II outlines the current state of the art in AIRSs and their
key features. The collaborative model designed for intrusion
management in multi-domain environments is defined in
Section III, while Section IV presents the designed trust and
reputation model. Section V tackles the diverse responses
that the system may trigger, with a special emphasis on
the deception responses based on the dynamic honeynets
generated on virtualized platforms. Section VI presents
the RECLAMO project where all the above concepts are
applied to achieve a novel automated response system to
attacks. Section VII presents some experimental results to
demonstrate the benefits of using the designed trust and
reputation model. Section VIII discusses the main related
work and finally, Section IX summarizes our contributions.
II. AUTOMATED INTRUSION RESPONSE SYSTEMS
Dr. Natalia Stakhanova et al. presented in [2] a taxonomy
of autonomous intrusion response systems, together with a
review of current trends in intrusion response research.
According to such a paper, AIRSs can be classified in
different ways according to various characteristics:
• By ability to adjust: Static and adaptive. Adaptability
is a powerful feature that can automatically modify the
chosen response according to other external factors, like
the previous response effectiveness.
• By response selection mechanism: Static mapping, dy-
namic mapping, and cost-sensitive mapping. There is an
increasing interest in developing cost-sensitive models
for response selection recently. The primary goal of
such models is to ensure an adequate response without
sacrificing the normal system functionality.
• By time of response: Proactive and delayed. Proactivity
is the ability of the AIRS to react against an intrusion
or attack before it takes place.
• By cooperation capabilities: Autonomous and coopera-
tive. Network-based IRSs are often built in a coope-
rative fashion, because they provide more effective
responses than autonomous systems.
To achieve an optimal response in the shortest time, it is
required that AIRSs are adaptive, cost-sensitive mapping,
proactive, and cooperative. But there is another feature
(semantic coherence) that is not present in this taxonomy
and is crucial in heterogeneous detection networks.
Semantic coherence is the system ability to understand
the syntax and semantic of the intrusion report, with inde-
pendence of the intrusion source. The intrusion response
system would understand intrusion alerts or events with
diverse syntaxes from different IDSs, and it would be able to
determine whether two alerts refer to the same or different
intrusions. This would improve system performance and
efficiency, because the system only performs an action to
respond to different alerts concerning the same intrusion.
In addition to the taxonomy presented in [2], several
AIRSs have been proposed in recent years such as
• AAIRS (Adaptive Agent-based Intrusion Response Sys-
tem), a methodology for adaptive and automated intru-
sion response using software agents [3];
• ADEPTS (Adaptive Intrusion Tolerant Systems) that
models intrusions by using attack graphs to identify
possible attack targets, and provides methods to auto-
matically trigger a suitable response [4];
• EMERALD (Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to
Anomalous Live Disturbances) [5] and CSM (Coope-
rating Security Managers) [6], host-based and distri-
buted intrusion detection and response systems;
• SARA (Survivable Autonomic Response Architecture),
a system developed to provide an effective defense
against fast and distributed information attacks by using
coordinated autonomic responses [7];
• and MAIRF (Mobile Agents-based Intrusion Response
Frame), a system based on mobile agents that is focused
on the source of attackers [8].
The functionalities of these systems, according to the
previously mentioned features, are mapped in Table I.
None of these AIRSs offers ways to achieve semantic
coherence among diverse signs of the same incident. For
example, ADEPTS relies on specific formats and syntaxes
of intrusion notifications. Instead, the autonomous system
proposed by RECLAMO sorts out semantic coherence by
using ontologies, formal behavior specification languages,
and reasoning mechanisms as a working technology, as well
as fulfilling the rest of the requirements.
A
A
IR
S
A
D
E
PT
S
E
M
E
R
A
L
D
C
SM
SA
R
A
M
A
IR
F
Adaptive
√ √ √
Cost-sensitive
√ √ √
Proactive
√ √ √
Cooperative
√ √
Semantic coherence
Table I
FUNCTIONALITIES OF THE AIRSS
One of the main advantages in using ontologies is the
formalization of the information semantics. This is important
when dealing with heterogeneous information sources that
can represent the same resource with different formats and
syntaxes. Within the scope of this work, using ontologies
helps to support inclusion of different and heterogeneous
IDSs, with different intrusion formats and syntaxes, and
different sources of network and system context.
There are several ontology languages such as KIF (Know-
ledge Interchange Format), SHOE (Simple HTML Ontology
Extensions), RDF (Resource Description Framework), OIL
(Ontology Inference Layer), OWL (Web Ontology Lan-
guage), and OWL2. The latter is the main ontology lan-
guage used nowadays in Semantic Web in order to formally
describe information definitions [9]. OWL2 is a know-
ledge definition language that structures the information into
classes and properties –nominal or relation among objects–,
with hierarchies, and range and domain restrictions.
OWL2 introduces some improvements in the knowledge
representation aspect, but its competence to define beha-
vior related to the defined information is limited. So it is
necessary to use additional rule languages; for example,
KAoS (Knowledge-able Agent-oriented System), Rei, SWRL
(Semantic Web Rule Language) or OWL-Services. Among
them, SWRL is the most widely used language of rules in
Semantic Web, which includes a type of axiom, called Horn
clause logic, of the form if... then..., to specify the behavior
of the system [10].
III. COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION
NETWORKS
Attackers have changed the execution of their malicious
practices towards a new mode of operation more global and
distributed. Their main goal is that their attacks go unnoticed
by exploiting current drawbacks inherent to existing IDSs.
Because of their widespread nature in execution, current
information and communication systems are being attacked,
and thence compromised, by more sophisticated threats.
This drawback is innate to existing IDSs, where the alerts
generated by them are viewed as isolated incidents with no
relevance when they are analyzed individually [11].
As a solution, alerts generated by IDSs have to be treated
as a whole from a more global point of view in order to know
what is happening in the entire network. A much more global
perception about the system will provide a better opportunity
of detecting complex threats, such as distributed intrusions
or attacks. Hence, the deployment of multiple IDS instances
among all security domains can achieve a better detection
coverage and accuracy in multi-domain environments.
The security information detected by IDSs –alerts and
attacks– is gathered from all the security domains belonging
to the AIRS that is being monitored. In addition, further
information from other administrative domains can also be
incorporated in the detection processes in order to reach a
better knowledge base in detecting distributed attacks.
The union of all IDSs entails to have a close collaboration
among them when they are placed in more than one security
or administrate domain, this being a critical factor in the
success of detecting distributed attacks [12]. Thus, relation-
ships among all IDSs form an overlay layer for exchanging
security information among peers; mainly, alerts, incidents,
and attacks detected by each IDS in an individual fashion.
This cooperative system is named Collaborative Intrusion
Detection Network (CIDN) that allows building a collective
knowledge base of isolated alerts [13].
Placement of IDSs is a key issue for the proper exchange
of information among them. An in-depth survey about how
to distribute IDSs to obtain the best results in performance
(centralized, hierarchical, and fully distributed architectures)
is provided in [11]. Instead, we propose in this paper to
follow a partially-decentralized approach so as to tackle
the drawbacks implicit in each [14]. Partially-decentralized
schemes address the problems of having a single point of
failure and the lack of scalability, derived from centralized
approaches, and the overhead and management difficulty,
derived from hierarchical and decentralized schemes [15].
Figure 2 illustrates an example of the system architecture
that we propose in this paper, which is based on a partially-
decentralized scheme.
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Figure 2. Partially-decentralized scheme of a CIDN
The partially-decentralized scheme proposed in this work
is built by using a supernode (or superpeer) that acts as the
head or leader of its security domain [16]. This is in charge
of sharing the collective (intra-domain) knowledge base built
in its domain with other domains, through their leaders,
thereby constructing the global (inter-domain) knowledge
base at CIDN level.
As seen in Figure 2, the CIDN is composed of three
security domains, or Intrusion Detection Networks (IDN),
belonging to two administrative domains. The intra-domain
knowledge base is built internally in each IDN through
the alerts detected by its IDSs, while the inter-domain
knowledge base is achieved by sharing the alerts and attacks
detected in each IDN separately. In this sense, it provides
a common and holistic view for intrusion management
among IDSs, working either in the same or in different
administrative domains.
The exchange of security information among IDSs of the
same IDN, and also among IDNs working collaboratively
to detect distributed attacks, will be made only with those
that are considered trustworthy enough according to a trust
a reputation model, as the one presented below.
IV. TRUST AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
As previously mentioned, IDSs deployed in the same
domain, or IDN, exchange security information among them
in order to share a collaborative (intra-domain) knowledge
base of alerts. Furthermore, the leaders of each IDN also
exchange security information with each other in order to
share a global (inter-domain) knowledge base about alerts
and attacks [17]. In both cases, the accuracy of such a
security information has to be assessed to confirm whether
IDSs and/or IDNs have exhibited an honest or malicious
behavior in their detection capabilities.
This proof of confidence checks if the security information
corresponds to an actual incident occurred in the CIDN.
Depending on this assessment, the alert or attack will be
shared with the rest of the parties, or directly discarded as
the reporting IDSs or IDNs are behaving maliciously.
An IDS, as any other kind of software, might be compro-
mised by an attacker or to have an anomalous behavior due
to malfunctioning. For example, if a bogus alert, generated
from scratch by a compromised IDS, conveys real data about
a legitimate user as the event source, the IDN’s IRS might
react by blocking any activity from/to such a user or even
in the context of this work, by creating an unnecessary
honeynet. Thus, it is required to measure the goodness of
IDSs and IDNs before sharing their alerts and attacks.
As a solution, trust and reputation management systems
can be used to measure the confidence that an IDS or IDN
can deposit on others to accept their alerts and attacks as
benevolent, and thence valid, either IDSs or IDNs running
in the same or different administrative domains [18]. In the
latter case, the use of ontologies and a common language
and format in order to exchange security information, as
introduced in Section II, is a key requirement to make the
proposed trust and reputation mechanism a reality.
In [13], a trust-based framework is presented to avoid
sharing bogus alerts within a CIDN. Moreover, an admission
control algorithm is proposed for the Host-based IDSs
(HIDSs) to select their collaborators. However, this proposal
is restricted to the management of HIDSs, leaving Network-
based IDSs (NIDSs) out of scope. Instead, a complete trust
and reputation system for HIDSs and NIDSs, including
their management in intra- and inter-domain environments,
is proposed in [19]. Nevertheless, the reputation model
designed for inter-domain scenarios is quite generic, and no
experimental results are provided.
Bearing in mind both works, we propose in this paper that
the trust of a generic domain or IDN Ω on a new alert or
attack a, denoted as TΩ(a), and generated by one or more
IDSs regardless of their placement, is computed by using (1).
Note that TΩ(a) is quantified in [−1, 1].
TΩ(a) = α · µΩ(a) + β ·
 n⊕
i=1,i6=Ω
µi(a)× TΩ,i
 (1)
where µ(a) ∈ [−1, 1] is the confidence that a domain
has on its IDSs with the proper configuration to detect the
alert or attack a; ⊕ is an aggregation operation such as a
mean or minimum function; n is the total number of domains
with which Ω maintains a trust relationship; TΩ,i ∈ [0, 1]
represents the trustworthiness that Ω has on the i-th domain;
and α, β ∈ [0, 1], with α+β = 1, are two weights to balance
the importance between local and external evidences.
The right-hand part of (1) can be seen as a recommenda-
tion about the own experiences of the Ω’s reliable domains
in detecting the same alert or attack a. Note that they will
only share by those, through their leaders, that detected a.
A neutral trust on a, i.e., TΩ(a) = 0, reflects an absolute
lack of confidence in detecting such an alert or attack. This
uncertainty indicates that the IDSs that generated a have the
same belief in this detection that those that did not.
On the other hand, µ(a) can be computed as described
below, according to the number and reputation –denoted as
Rep(ids) ∈ [0, 1]– of the IDSs that generated a and those
that did not when they were properly configured for it. The
former IDSs are part of the set G –generation–, while the
latter are part of the set R –rejection–, with A = G ∪R.
µ(a) =
max{ϕG} · ϕG · |ϕG| −max{ϕR} · ϕR · |ϕR|
ϕA · |ϕA|
where ϕ represents the list of reputation values of all the
IDSs involved in detecting a, i.e., ϕ = {Rep(ids)}, ∀ids,
belonging to the set G, R, or A; max{ϕ} is the highest
reputation among all the IDSs belonging to a given set;
ϕ is the average reputation of the IDSs with respect to a
set; and |ϕ| is the total number of IDSs in G, R, or A.
The maximum reputation of a given set, max{ϕ}, has
been included in this equation to limit the confidence on a
to the IDS with the highest reputation value; µ(a) cannot
exceed the reputation of the most trustworthy IDS.
On the other hand, the weights in computing TΩ(a), both
α and β, can be set by the Ω’s administrator as predefined
and fixed values (e.g., by setting α = 0.75 and β = 0.25).
Even though using fixed weights can be considered as valid,
we propose in this paper to follow a dynamic approach.
Both weights can be computed according to the number
of local instances of the alert or attack, generated by the
IDSs deployed in the generic domain Ω, and those instances
generated in other reliable domains for Ω as recommendation
sources. Hence, α and β can then be computed as
α =
ΦΩ(ids)
ΦΩ(ids) +
n∑
i=1
Φi(ids)× TΩ,i
, β = 1− α (2)
where Φ(ids) represents the percentage of instances gen-
erated by the IDSs in a given domain, i.e., |ids| ∈ G divided
by |ids| ∈ A, ∀ids; n is the total number of domains with
which Ω has a trust relationship; and, as in (1), TΩ,i is the
trustworthiness that Ω has on the i-th security domain.
In this sense, as the number of alert or attack instances is
higher in remote domains, the greater the importance their
recommendations is in contrast to the local opinion, always
depending on the trustworthiness that Ω has on them.
Once computing the trust on the new alert or attack a, by
using (1), the domain has to decide if it is reliable or not.
For example, a simple and suitable solution is to check if
TΩ(a) > TΩ,σ , where TΩ,σ is a predefined threshold value
set by the Ω’s administrator.
On the other hand, and provided that a is considered as
reliable, each domain should update its trust on
1# the rest of the domains involved in detecting the alert
or attack a, by computing the new TΩ,i from the
perspective of Ω; and
2# the new reputation of the IDSs depending on their
behavior exhibited in sharing the alert or attack, by
computing the new Rep(ids) for each IDS involved
in the detection of the alert or attack a.
Both calculations for this update (options 1# and 2#) can
be made at time t, from the perspective of Ω, as
T
(t)
Ω,i = T
(t−1)
Ω,i + SatΩ,i(a) (3)
Rep
(t)
Ω (ids) = Rep
(t−1)
Ω (ids)±|(TΩ(a)−TΩ,σ)·µΩ(a)| (4)
where (t−1) is the previous time when both values were
computed; SatΩ,i(a) ∈ [−1, 1] is the satisfaction of Ω with
the i-th reliable domain in detecting the same alert or attack;
|(TΩ(a) − TΩ,σ) · µΩ(a)| indicates the absolute success of
the IDS in detecting a; and ± is the reward or punish on the
basis of the behavior exhibited by the IDS in its detection.
The satisfaction between two domains, from the perspec-
tive of the domain Ω, relies on the assessment made by the
i-th domain in comparison with the local opinion of Ω, but
also taking into account external recommendations about the
same alert or attack. This calculation is made through
SatΩ,i(a) = TΩ(a)−
γ · µΩ(a) + δ · n⊕
j=1,j 6=i
µj(a)× T (t−1)Ω,j

where TΩ(a) has been computed in (1); µ(a) represents
the confidence of a domain in its IDSs to detect a; ⊕ is the
same aggregation operation used in (1); n is the total number
of domains with which Ω maintains a trust relationship,
except the i-th domain that is being assessed; T (t−1)Ω,j is
the previous trustworthiness of Ω on the j-th domain; and
γ, δ ∈ [0, 1] have the same meanings that the weights α and
β, but extracting the i-th reliable domain in (2).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that those domains that
have not informed about a, from the perspective of Ω,
should be excluded from the satisfaction computation among
domains. That is, T (t)Ω,i will not be updated if the domain i
has not shared the alert or attack a.
V. INTRUSION RESPONSES
After detecting a new threat by the IDSs deployed in a
distributed fashion, as shown in Section III, the autonomous
intrusion response system has to deploy the most appropriate
response to mitigate and/or learn about the threat, provided
that it is true according to the trust and reputation model
of Section IV. This system must be able to rapidly react
against intrusions and attacks in an autonomous and optimal
way, without the administrator intervention. The reaction
includes to infer the optimal response (diagnosis phase) and
the deployment of such a response (reaction phase).
As mentioned in Section II, several AIRS solutions have
been proposed in recent years to improve the limited res-
ponse of current IDSs. They enrich the security information
obtained from IDSs with other information sources, like
the correlation of alerts or information about systems. The
optimum response will be inferred to deploy and create the
specifications needed to carry it out. To do so, the use of
ontologies and formal policy languages is essential to define
the behavior of the autonomous system and provide it with
the ability of the self-protection required.
Classical reactions typically consist on deploying new
firewall rules, whereas AIRS opens new possibilities in reac-
tion; for example, by creating honeynets specifically adapted
to the attack being detected. In this context, RECLAMO
proposes a reaction based on the configuration and auto-
matic deployment of honeynets optimized and adapted to
each attack, according to the specifications provided by
the autonomous system. A honeynet is basically a set of
honeypot systems –servers, clients, and routers– as similar
as possible to the production ones, but specifically prepared
to be attacked and equipped with silent tools to allow
monitoring attacks that go unnoticed to attackers.
All systems in a honeynet are typically interconnected by
following a network topology similar to the production one
that is being protected or studied. Given the complexity in
launching a honeynet, virtualization is an essential technique
that greatly facilitates its deployment and management. Its
ability to build and deploy multiple logical systems over
a single physical box drastically reduces the number of
physical systems needed to create a honeynet, also allowing
increasing the complexity of the honeynets created.
There are many projects and initiatives that have used
virtualization as a basic tool to dynamically create honey-
nets. One of the most advanced ones is Collapsar that
combines a powerful distributed traffic capture system with
a server farm [20], where the interesting traffic is redirected
to dynamically create honeynets that process it.
The use of complex honeynets results in the need for spe-
cialized tools to manage them. They should facilitate their
definition –topology, addresses, types of systems, among
others–, their deployment, and their monitoring, hiding all
the complexity of the underlying virtualization platforms.
There are several tools available such as VNX (Virtual Net-
works over linuX), Netkit, MLN (Manage Large Networks),
and vBET (VM-Based Emulation Testbed). Among them,
VNX emerges as the most powerful solution due to i) its
ability to deploy virtual network scenarios over a cluster of
servers; ii) its large scalability in creating high interaction
honeynets; and iii) the creation of very complex honeynets,
even over distributed cluster infrastructures [21].
VI. THE RECLAMO PROJECT
RECLAMO is a research project aimed at designing
and creating an advanced framework for enhancing existing
intrusion detection and reaction proposals. To reach this
ambitious objective, this project deals with the different key
technologies mentioned before and combine them in a single
solution to provide an automated response system to attacks.
The concept of self-protection, as one of the four features
of any autonomous system, is the key concept driving
the main component of the RECLAMO architecture. This
provides the ability to infer the most appropriate response for
a given intrusion, taking into account not just the intrusion,
but also other parameters related to it, such as the context
or the trust and reputation of the network source.
The proposed autonomous system will use information
models, formally defined with ontologies, to combine in-
trusion data, self-evaluation parameters, trust and reputation
of the different involved elements –IDSs and IDNs–, and
security information coming from collaborative IDS-based
systems in the same or different administrative domains.
This security information will be assessed with a set of
security metrics, represented with formally-defined behavior
specification languages, in order to reason and infer the most
appropriate response, taking into account all the inputs and
other criteria specified in the security metrics.
The most promising approach in RECLAMO is the one
based on advanced reaction techniques, with a special focus
on the so-called deception responses. They are based on the
dynamic generation and deployment of honeynets, where the
attacks will be diverted, that will be created ad-hoc for each
attack. The most optimal reaction will be optimized to gather
as much information as possible from each attack.
The diversion of the attack to a dynamically ad-hoc
generated honeynet is to be adequately confined in order to
mitigate it and learn from it. The dynamic honeynet genera-
tion will be done by using advanced virtualization techniques
able to generate large-scale heterogeneous honeynets.
An envisaged architecture of the system, including all the
components and solutions presented in previous sections, is
schematically shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. System architecture of RECLAMO
Intrusions or attacks detected from the alerts individually
generated by each IDS are analyzed in real-time by using
a model of intrusions, responses, and security metrics that
allow triggering an inference process from the detected in-
trusion. Concepts like autonomous system, ontologies, trust
and reputation management, collaborative intrusion detec-
tion and prevention networks, self-protection, and virtualized
honeynets are clearly identified in Figure 3. All of these
concepts are considered as a key part of the novel automated
response system to attacks proposed in RECLAMO.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We discuss in this section some experimental results
obtained with a prototype implementation. The fundamental
aim is to assess how the designed trust and reputation model,
presented in Section IV, can strengthen the RECLAMO’s
automated intrusion response system in order to avoid
unnecessary responses against bogus or fictitious threats.
For example, this will avert the creation of an unnecessary
honeynet in the context of this work.
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Figure 4. Events shared or discarded by IDSs with a benevolent or malicious behavior while varying their goodness over time
A. Experiment 1: Assessing Resilience against Malicious or
Misbehaving IDSs
In this first experiment, we have simulated a single IDN to
evaluate the events –alerts and attacks– shared by its IDSs as
their behaviors or goodness vary throughout time. This IDN
is composed of 50 IDSs with an initial reputation of 1. In
order to decide if events are reliable, we have set the IDN’s
threshold to 0.25 (i.e., TIDN,σ = 0.25). In this experimental
setting, we have injected 1000 random events for each of
the goodness values exhibited by the IDSs (around 50 % of
reliable events and the rest of bogus).
It is worth emphasizing that no external evidences, or
recommendations, are taking into account in computing
the trust on the diverse events, as a single IDN has been
simulated. That is, just the left-hand part of (1) is considered.
Moreover, the update process of the trustworthiness values
among IDNs –see (3) in Section IV– is not carried out for the
same reason as before; just the update of the IDSs reputation
is performed –see (4) in Section IV.
Figure 4 depicts two outcomes of this first experiment.
In both charts, the y-axis represents the percentage of the
events shared and discarded by IDSs with a benevolent or
malicious attitude, while the x-axis represents the goodness
when they generate events. In this latter case, a goodness of 1
indicates that IDSs properly classify the events as reliable or
bogus; that is, they expose a complete benevolent behavior.
In the opposite case, a goodness of 0 indicates that IDSs
exhibit a complete malicious behavior.
In this experiment, malicious IDSs have been simulated
from two different perspectives. First, Figure 4a shows the
outcomes when IDSs exhibit a usual random behavior in
their detection tasks (they sometimes share the events, while
other times do not report anything). Secondly, Figure 4b
shows the outcomes when IDSs present a collusive behavior,
thereby forming a malicious collective, always taking the
same decision about sharing the events or not. In both cases,
malicious IDSs share the events if they are bogus, or not
when they are actually reliable.
As seen in Figure 4a, the proposed trust and reputation
system is able to detect up to a 50 % of IDSs with a
malicious attitude without any collusion among them; there
is only a negligible error in discarding a 1.6 % of reliable
or benevolent events (98.4 % of success). From that 50 %,
more and more reliable events are discarded as the IDSs
behavior is getting worse. Nevertheless, events generated by
malicious IDSs are not shared although their behaviors decay
in time; such IDSs lost their reputations previously and only
a 1.8 % of bogus events are finally shared.
Results are worse when all the IDSs form a malicious
collective for deceiving the IDN. These outcomes are shown
in Figure 4b. In this case, reliable events begin to be
discarded from a 20 % of malicious IDSs, although up to a
30 % of these IDSs indicate good results by only discarding
a 6.3 % of benevolent events.
However, as opposed to the previous case, bogus events
are increasingly shared as the goodness value of the IDSs
worsens. This fact is due to malicious IDSs begin to behave
in the same way, i.e., there is no diversity in their attitudes,
leading the IDN to believe that its IDSs are detecting the
events in a proper fashion. At the end of this second test,
all IDSs have the highest reputation so that the IDN cannot
discriminate them as malicious.
As a main conclusion of this first experiment, we can
affirm that the proposed trust and reputation system is
capable of, at least, supporting a 30 % of malicious IDSs
(goodness = 0.7) without the RECLAMO architecture
being compromised. Our trust and reputation system gets
even better results when there is no collusion among such
IDSs, achieving a very promising performance with up to a
50 % of malicious IDSs.
B. Experiment 2: Detecting Malicious IDNs
We have extended the previous experiment towards a
multi-domain environment, at CIDN level, to assess how
the behavior of the IDNs varies as their goodness worsens
in time. In this case, our intention is to extract the number
of necessary events until deciding if one or more IDNs are
behaving in a malicious fashion.
In this experiment, we have followed the same setting
as before, but simulating 25 IDNs with 50 IDSs in each
and injecting 100 sequential events in the CIDN for each
goodness value. Figure 5 depicts the outcomes, where each
line represents the percentage of malicious IDNs, while the
goodness indicates the behavior of their IDSs. Note that we
assume that an IDN is considered as malicious when its
trustworthiness TIDN,σ is below 0.25.
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Figure 5. Number of events needed to detect malicious IDNs
As can be observed in Figure 5, only 44 events are
required to classify an IDN as unreliable, when it is the
only malicious one in the CIDN and there is a 20 % of IDSs
in it (goodness = 0.8) with a malicious behavior. As their
goodness increases, it is easier and faster to identify such an
IDN as malicious. Nevertheless, this identification is “more
difficult” as the percentage of malicious IDNs increases.
On the other hand, less than 60 events are required to
classify a 40 % of the IDNs as unreliable, when they have
more than 40 % of malicious IDSs (goodness = 0.6).
Nevertheless, the number of events begins to be quite high
when there are more than a 40 % of unreliable IDNs, with up
to a 50 % of malicious IDSs, being this number above 100
events when there are an 80 % of unreliable IDNs regardless
of the amount of malicious IDSs in them.
As a main conclusion of this second experiment, we have
demonstrated that our trust and reputation system needs a
relatively small number of events in order to identify IDNs
with a malicious behavior, which can be isolated later for
not accepting their alerts as reliable.
Finally, and after analyzing the results of both experi-
ments, we can assert that the trust and reputation mana-
gement system proposed in Section IV is tough enough to
avoid launching unnecessary responses, i.e., the creation of a
honeynet, despite the presence of malicious IDSs or IDNs.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Along this paper, we have analyzed some related works
in the context of intrusion response systems with special
automated features in reaction. However, none of them
offers support for semantic coherence, a key feature when
operability is a crucial requirement in multi-domain envi-
ronments. In addition, George Kurtz is currently leading an
expert team to implement CrowdStrike [22]; an industrial
solution for building IDS-based honeynets to learn and react
against Advanced Persistent Threats. This is a still rather
immature solution whose its main weakness, in comparison
with our proposal, is that CrowdStrike does not rely on a
trust and reputation management system in order to isolate
the malicious components of its architecture.
On the other hand, we have also analyzed and discussed
a few works with another key requirement in the success
of an AIRS. This is the assessment of the information
sources, when IDSs share alerts and attacks stating that
they have detected an actual (distributed) threat. Without
this evaluation, IDSs with malicious attitudes can lead the
AIRS to react mistakenly against a bogus threat. Both [13]
and [19] are the first initiatives in this context, although none
of them presents an entire model for the trust and reputation
management in multi-domain environments.
To the best of our knowledge, RECLAMO is the first
proposal where a complete AIRS, with automated reaction
capabilities, is presented to build IDS-based honeynets by
considering the assessment outcomes from a multi-domain
trust and reputation model. This avoids improper responses
when a (distributed) threat has not actually happened.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have briefly reviewed the main objectives
and relevant topics behind the RECLAMO project. This is
a research project aimed at designing and creating an ad-
vanced framework for enhancing existing intrusion detection
and reaction proposals. To reach this ambitious objective,
RECLAMO deals with different key technologies, analyzed
in this paper, and combine them in a single solution to
provide an automated response system to attacks.
As one of the first results in the ongoing RECLAMO
project, we have presented a complete trust and reputation
model for multi-domain environments. This model allows
assessing the behavior of reporting IDSs in order to accept or
reject their alerts and attacks as reliable security information.
The experimental results have confirmed the importance of
a trust and reputation model before an AIRS infers and
deploys the most appropriate response.
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